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A Better Balance for All: 
Compulsory Licensing for Non-use Technology Patents  
 
Jason Comer 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The United States prides itself as being one of the most innovative and creative countries 
in the world.  Whether we look to Benjamin Franklin’s bifocals and lightening rod, Alexander 
Graham Bell’s telephone, or Henry Ford’s moving assembly line, we celebrate the ingenuity and 
entrepreneurial spirit that seems to be instilled inside all Americans.  The creativity that spawned 
these inventions has become as much a part of being an American as the Fourth of July. 
Right from the birth of our country, the inventions that flowed from these characteristics 
were cherished and protected under our laws.  The United States Constitution grants Congress 
the power, “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”1  These 
words were used to establish the foundation for patents and copyrights, which endorsed creation 
and fostered discoveries.  Specifically, patent law used this clause to build exclusive rights for 
patentees that grant the holder, “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States.”2 These protections have not only helped our country become the innovative powerhouse 
that we are today, but are necessary to continue our country’s inventiveness for the future.  As 
our inventions change to reflect the world we live in, however, so must the law protecting them.    
                                                        
1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 2 
Over the past several decades, individuals and companies have increasingly used the 
patent system to build-up patent portfolios that are not used to advance the progress of science 
for the public benefit, but to protect profit margins and hinder improvements.  Patent holders file 
for multiple patents on similar technologies simply to let them lay dormant and prevent 
competitors from entering an industry.
3
  Other firms use their exclusive rights, not to produce or 
manufacture the invention for the advancement of society, but to threaten injunctions and 
demand exorbitant fees from those who do.
4
  The current patent law system is flawed and needs 
a transformation that will more accurately reflect the original intent, as set forth in the 
Constitution,
5
 and prevent the harms that have emerged. 
This article argues for that change.  This modification needs to be in the form of 
compulsory licensing.  Specifically, our patent system needs to introduce compulsory licensing 
for non-use technology patents at a transparent and competitive rate.  Limiting compulsory 
licenses to non-use patents will allow revitalization in both the production and use of valuable 
innovations.  These previously un-used inventions will be brought to the marketplace and help 
advance our society as a whole. 
Part II of this article will examine current problems in patent law that has lead to an 
imbalance in favor of patentees and a restriction on access to information.  Part III will put forth 
the idea of mandatory licensing.  This section begins with a discussion of mandatory licensing as 
mentioned in intellectual property rights treaties signed by the United Sates.  This section 
continues with a discussion of compulsory licensing as used in foreign law and mandatory 
                                                        
3 Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing For Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1275, 1276 (2001); see also F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance 451 (2d ed. 1980). 
4 Troy L. Gwartney, Harmonizing the Exclusionary Rights of Patents with Compulsory 
Licensing, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1395, 1415-1416 (2009). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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licensing permitted throughout different areas of the current US intellectual property system. Part 
IV will set forth the proposed solution of mandatory licensing of patents that are currently not 
being used at a transparent and competitive rate.  This part will discuss which patents the 
proposal will apply to, how mandatory licensing should be decided, and how royalties should be 
calculated.  Part V will conclude with a discussion on how the proposed changes will better 
satisfy the goals and theories of intellectual property law.  This section will start with a 
discussion on the balancing theory as discerned from INS v. AP.
6
  Next, the article continues with 
a conversation on the net benefits approach.  Finally, the proposed change will be discussed 
under the externalities approach. 
 
 
II. Problems as a Result of Current Patent Law 
 
Patent law, as it exists today, has lead to a system that encourages patent hoarding and a 
run-up of licensing fees that would amount to extortion in any other context.  Many people do 
not see this as a problem because it is primarily companies that are being charged these 
exorbitant licensing fees and not individuals. When you look at these costs, however, it is the 
consuming public that ultimately foots the bill in the form of higher prices.  On the other hand, if 
the companies, and the public, decide not to pay the extortion rates they are threatened with 
litigation and injunctions that could halt production of useful items and in extreme cases, shut 
down entire industries. 
The current system is set around the proposition that, “[n]o patent owner otherwise 
entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief 
                                                        
6
 Int'l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (U.S. 1918). 
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or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having… 
refused to license or use any rights to the patent.”7  In other words, under current law, a court 
may not hold the fact that the patent is not being used or licensed against the patent holder when 
deciding an infringement case.  Further, a court may not find a patent holder guilty of 
misappropriation or abuse of his patent rights by not using it.  This statute has long been 
supported by case law that permits patentees to reserve the right to use or not use the underlying 
technology.
8
  What may have started off as a legitimate protection of an inventor’s rights has 
lead to the creation of individuals and companies called “patent trolls” and system of patent 
holdup
9
. 
Patent trolls operate by acquiring patents on emerging technology and waiting until 
companies develop a product that potentially infringes on the patents.
10
  The patent troll then 
waits until an industry develops around the potential patent infringing products.
11
  Once the 
                                                        
7
 35 U.S.C. 271(d)(4) (2006). 
8
 See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (U.S. 1908), and 
Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (U.S. 1945). 
9
 Thomas F. Cotter, Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium: Innovation & Competition 
Policy: Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1151, 
1153-54 (2009) (stating, “a proposed definition of patent holdup as occurring when a component 
patent owner is able to exploit its bargaining power vis-a-vis downstream users due to the 
possibility that the patent owner will be able to enjoin the manufacture, use, or sale of an end 
product that incorporates the patented invention, in such a way as to threaten either static 
deadweight losses far out of proportion to any likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or dynamic 
efficiency losses due to downstream users' reduced incentives to invest in standard-specific 
technology or to engage in follow-up innovation.”). 
10
 Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay V. Mercexchange Enough?, 14 J. Intell. 
Prop. L. 333, 335 (2007); see also, David G. Barker, Troll or no Troll? Policing Patent Usage 
with an Open Post-Grant Review, Duke L. & Tech. Rev. (Apr. 15, 2005), see also, Patent Trolls: 
Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14-17 (2006) (statement of Dean 
Kamen, President, DEKA Research & Dev. Corp.). 
11
 Myers, supra note 10, at 335. 
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industry is established, the patent troll will start to demand exorbitant licensing fees or threaten 
litigation that will shut down the industry.
12
 
One recent example in patent trolling is NTP, Inc.’s claims against Research in Motion 
(RIM).
13
  In November of 2001, NTP filed suit against RIM alleging that RIM, the manufacturer 
of BlackBerry cell phones, was infringing on several patents.
14
  The case resulted in an award of 
$54 million in damages and a permanent injunction that prohibited RIM from using the patented 
technology, which was of questionable validity.
15
  Facing shutdown, RIM, the maker of the most 
popular phone for businesses, was forced to settle for $612.5 million.
16
  NTP also settled for 
large fees from phone maker Nokia and wireless e-mail creator Good Technology.
17
  More 
recently, in 2010, NTP filed a slew of lawsuits against Apple, Google, HTC, LG, Microsoft, and 
Motorola.
18
  
The current patent system has lead to a hoarding of patents that are used by some simply 
for profit and not for “the progress of science and useful arts.”19  This system is flawed in that it 
                                                        
12
 Id. (arguing that the patents that the trolls are relying on are usually on trivial, but necessary, 
aspects of the overall product and of questionable validity). 
13
 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Myers, supra 
note 10, at 334. 
14
 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1289. 
15
 Id. at 1282, 1292. 
16
 Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP ink $612 Million Settlement, CNN Money (March 3, 
2006), available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/. 
17
 Myers, surpa note 10, at 334. 
18
 Nick Brown, NTP Sues Apple, Google Over Wireless E-Mail Patents, Forbes (July 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2010/07/11/ntp-sues-apple-google-over-
wireless-e-mail-patents/;  Eric Savitz, NTP is back; Files Patent Suits Vs. AAPL, GOOG, MSFT, 
MOT, Barron’s (July 9, 2010), available at 
http://blogs.barrons.com/techtraderdaily/2010/07/09/ntp-is-back-files-patent-suits-vs-aapl-goog-
msft-mot/. 
19
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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supports the hindrance of both useful technology and public access to goods.  As Justice Douglas 
stated in a powerful dissent in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe,
20
 
The result is that suppression of patents has become commonplace. Patents are multiplied 
to protect an economic barony or empire, not to put new discoveries to use for the 
common good. “It is common practice to make an invention and to secure a patent to 
block off a competitor's progress. By studying his ware and developing an improvement 
upon it, a concern may ‘fence in' its rival; by a series of such moves, it may pin the trade 
enemy within a technology which rapidly becomes obsolete. As often as not such 
maneuvers retard, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts. Invariably their 
effect is to enlarge and to prolong personal privilege within the public domain.” One 
patent is used merely to protect another. The use of a new patent is suppressed so as to 
preclude experimentation which might result in further invention by competitors. A 
whole technology is blocked off. The result is a clog to our economic machine and a 
barrier to an economy of abundance.
21
 
Even back in 1945, Justice Douglas saw the harms that exclusive patent rights were causing for 
the advancement of technology in our society.  He knew that the ability to exclude, while it can 
be beneficial to those who are working their patents, could be easily utilized to hinder both 
competitors and the public.  By allowing non-use patent holders to maintain their exclusive 
rights, companies can receive a slew of patents and simply hold them so as to cordon off 
competition in an entire sector.  This only grants a monopoly and hinders competition that would 
result in lower prices and hence greater access by the public to these goods.  Further, Justice 
Douglas points out that non-use patents were, and continue to be, used to prevent competitors 
from developing advancements on existing technologies.  This can lead to a smothering of entire 
technologies and a repression of science and useful arts.  The current system requires a change 
that no longer protects patent trolls and the abuses that come with them.  This change needs to 
include compulsory licensing. 
 
                                                        
20
 324 U.S. 370 (U.S. 1945). 
21
 Id. at 382-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
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III. Compulsory Licensing in an International Context 
 
 
Compulsory licensing is not a new idea to the area of intellectual property.  The Paris 
Convention of 1883,
22
 one of the first intellectual property treaties, authorized its signatories to 
use compulsory licenses in several scenarios.
23
   The purpose of this treaty was to provide an 
international system for the protection of inventions abroad.
24
  The treaty is intended to promote 
uniformity in international intellectual property law and, through its administrator, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), attempt to harmonize national intellectual property 
legislation.
25
  The provisions set forth by the Paris Convention are incorporated in many 
countries’ intellectual property systems throughout the world.26 
                                                        
22
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Sept. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
23
 Id. Specifically the treaty provisions state: 
2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for 
example, failure to work; 
3) Forfeiture of the patent will not be provided for except where the grant of 
compulsory licenses is not sufficient to prevent abuses. Forfeiture or revocation of 
a patent will not be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of 
the first compulsory license; 
4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work 
or insufficient working before the expiration of three years from the date of 
application for the patent, or four years from the date of the grant of the patent 
whichever period expires last. It shall be refused if the patentee justifies his 
inaction by legitimate reasons. Such compulsory license shall be non-exclusive 
and shall not be transferable even in the form of the grant of a sub-license except 
with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license. 
Id. at art. 5(A). 
24
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1284. 
25
 Id. See Kevin Cuenot, Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 105 (1999). 
26
 See infra pp. 8-9. 
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 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
27
 is another 
international treaty that attempts to set standards for harmonizing international intellectual 
property law. Some aspects of the TRIPS agreement have been adopted into current US patent 
law, including the extension of a patent term to twenty years.
28
  However, there are some aspects 
of TRIPS that the US has refused to adopt.
29
  Included in the TRIPS agreement is a system by 
which governments may grant compulsory licenses to potential licensees.
30
  Mandatory licensing 
is set up under Article 31, which has the following elements in order to acquire the license:  
1) authorization must be considered on the individual merits;  
2) the applicant has attempted to obtain a license from the patent holder;  
3) the use is nonexclusive and nonassignable;  
4) the use is primarily for the domestic market; and  
5) the patent holder receives adequate remuneration.
31
 
 
Many developed countries use the Paris Convention and TRIPS as a basis to permit 
compulsory licensing of patents in non-use situations in their domestic law.
32
  These nations treat 
the issuance of a patent similar to a contract between the government and the patentee, “where 
the patentee is given the right to prevent others from using the invention under the implied 
condition that the patent holder will exploit the invention in the State, thereby benefiting the 
                                                        
27
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 
81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
28
 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2006); TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 33; Yosick, supra note 20, at 1285. 
29
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1285, (pointing out that “the United States is the only major country 
using a first-to-invent rather than a first-to-file system, which has presented a major obstacle in 
the road to patent harmonization.”). 
30
 TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31. (seting out that the government may grant licenses for patents 
against the will of the patentee. The agreement sets out clear rules that governments should 
follow in granting compulsory licenses against the will of the patentee). See generally Sara M. 
Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement: Balancing Pills and 
Patents, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 941 (2000). 
31
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1286; TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31 
32
 Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality; 
33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 349, 372-395 (1993). 
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community”.33  If the patent holder does not use the invention underlying the patent, he is treated 
as having breached his contract and the state has the right to reduce the rights granted, such as 
relieving the holder of exclusive rights.
34
  Countries use different meanings of the term “use” and 
“worked” when judging whether a patent is non-use.  In most countries, the term simply means 
that the underlying invention must be available in the country without regard to whether it is 
produced domestically or imported.
35
 
In the United Kingdom, mandatory licensing is available in situations where, three years 
after the issuance of the patent, demand in the U.K. “is not being met on reasonable terms,” or if 
the refusal to grant licenses by the patentee hinders “the establishment or development of 
commercial or industrial activities.”36  In Japan, mandatory licensing is available where the 
patented technology is not used in the country for three years or in situations “where working is 
in the public interest.”37  Furthermore, in Canada, a mandatory license is available if the demand 
for the technology is not being adequately met three years after the grant. 
38
  Finally, Germany 
permits compulsory licensing is not used within three years of the issuance or if the patent holder 
refuses to license the technology and that license would be “indispensable in the public 
                                                        
33
 Id. at 351. 
34
 Id. at 351-352 (citing A. Mian, Compulsory Licensing--Copyright and Patents, as presented at 
the Regional Forum on the Judiciary and the Intellectual Property System, Islamabad, Pakistan 
(1986).) 
35
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1288; Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United 
States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 666, 672 (1988). 
36
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1289 (citing Patents Act of 1977, 48, 48A(1)(b), (c) (2001) (Eng.)) 
37
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1290 (citing Patent Law art. 83(1). 93(1) (2001)); See 2F John P. 
Sinnott, World Patent Law and Practice, Japanese Patent Law of 1959 (as amended through May 
6, 1998) 
38
 Patent Act, R.S.C. ch. P-4, S. 65 (2006) (Can.). 
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interest.”39 
Compulsory Licensing in the United States 
  There are also several areas of United States law that alter the exclusive rights of the 
patent holder. The U.S. Government or its contractors may use any patent; the only remedy for 
the patent holder is monetary compensation, not injunction.
40
  Any party that is required to 
comply with regulations under the Clean Air Act may apply for a mandatory patent license.
41
  
The United States Atomic Energy Commission also has the power to grant compulsory licenses 
to applicants under defined circumstances.
42
  When the Commission grants these licenses, the 
terms will be equitable and based off “similar licensees for comparable use.”43  
United States’ case law has also developed compulsory licenses for remedies to anti-trust 
cases.
44
  In United States v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
45
 a group of glass companies were attempting 
to monopolize the glassware and glass container industry by collecting patents on machines that 
manufactured glassware and instituting litigation against competitors.
46
  The Court noted that 
this course of action by the defendants constituted “conspiracies against the public interests, and 
abuses of patent privileges.”47  The Court then ordered, “all the defendants shall be required to 
license anyone, royalty free, in the manufacture of machines embodying these patent rights.”48  
                                                        
39
 Yosick, supra note 3, at 1290; (citing Patentgesetz [German Patent Law], Jul 31, 2009, art. 
24). See 2 J.W. Baxter, World Patent Law and Practice 8.02 (2001). 
40
 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) (2006). 
41
 40 CFR 95.2 (2006). 
42
 42 U.S.C. 2183(e) (2006). 
43
 Id. 
44
 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1973); Besser Mfg. Co. v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
45
 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (D. Ohio 1942). 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. at 619 (citing National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 F. 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1897)). 
48
 Hartford-Empire, 46 F. Supp. at 621. 
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Even though anti-trust case law, along with certain statutory exemptions, provides mandatory 
licensing, it is only in narrowly defined areas that do not adequately address a growing 
problem.
49
 
 
IV. Proposed Change Allowing For Compulsory Licensing 
 
Current patent law needs to be revised to include a process for mandatory licensing for 
non-use technology patent holders.  The proposed solution will allow a potential licensee of a 
technology patent to petition the Federal District Court for a mandatory license at a transparent 
and reasonable rate.  Importantly, this proposal applies to all technology patents.  Instead of 
choosing specific industries that would be eligible for compulsory licensing, this proposal treats 
all technology patents the same.  Non-discrimination between industries and technology patents 
is the correct path to take because it reflects the current policy of patent law.
50
 
In order to receive the mandatory license, the potential licensee must first prove that the 
patent is a non-use technology patent.  In order to prove non-use of a patent, the licensee must 
begin by showing that the requisite time frame has passed since the issuance of the patent.  This 
time frame, set in accordance with International intellectual property treaties, will be four years 
                                                        
49
 See supra Part II. 
50 John W. Schlicher, Biotechnology and the Patent System; Patent Law and Procedures for 
Biotechnology, Health Care and Other Industries, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121 (1996). 
When the USPTO asked for written testimony about whether patents across different industries 
should be treated the same, Schlicher responded,  
United States consumers benefit from advances in biotechnology and all other 
technologies. For that reason, patents apply to all areas of technology where there 
are opportunities for profit-motivated people to conduct research and produce 
technical information. Because the policy of patent law applies to all 
technologies, patent law doctrines must apply across the board to all technologies. 
Id. at 126. 
 12 
from the date of application for the patent or three years from the date of grant, whichever is 
later.
51
  The licensee must then show that the patent is not being “worked”.  For the purposes of 
the proposal, “worked” will simply mean “used”.  The law will not allow a patent holder to hide 
the underlying technology from the world, “but must exploit it and share its benefits even while 
maintaining exclusive rights to the profits.”52  When looking at the “use” of a patented 
technology, importation would make the item available to the public and therefore qualify as 
“use” of the patent.53  
The next step is determining guidelines on which to grant compulsory licenses.  At first it 
may seem impossible to formulate a system of rules to grant such licenses, but existing case law 
can provide a starting point.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange
54
 provides the fundamental 
underpinnings of the proposed change.  While many scholars have argued both the merits and 
effect of the eBay decision
55
, our examination of the case is simply to retrieve what will become 
the backbone of our proposal. 
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
56
, the Supreme Court decided that a permanent 
injunction should not automatically stem from a violation of the Patent Act.
57
  As one 
commentator explains, “the U.S. Supreme Court effectively abrogated the ‘general 
                                                        
51
 Paris Convention, supra note 95, at art. 5. 
52
 Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 672 (1988). 
53
 See Yosick, supra note 3, at 1302 (“[I]f the item was available through importation, no license 
would be available.”). 
54
 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 
55
 Myers, supra note 10; see also Gregory d’Incelli, Has eBay Spelled the End of Patent Troll 
Abuses? Paying to Toll: The Rise (And Fall?) of the Patent Troll, 17 U. Miami BUS. L. REV. 343 
(2009); See also Nathan A. Skop, PATENT LAW: FOUR FACTORS TO INJUNCTIONS IN THE 
WAKE OF eBAY, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 135 (2007); Joshua T. Morrow, eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 33 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 743 (2007). 
56
 547 U.S. 388. 
57
 Id. at 393-94. 
 13 
rule’[requiring permanent injunctions unless exceptional circumstances] that the Federal Circuit 
had adopted in its approach to issuing permanent injunctions in patent infringement cases, 
holding that the traditional four-factor test for issuing permanent injunctive relief according to 
well-established principles of equity applied equally to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”58  
The four-factor test says, 
[a] plaintiff must demonstrate:  
1. that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
2. that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury;  
3. that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and  
4. that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.59   
These four factors are what the plaintiff in a patent infringement case needs to prove in order to 
get an injunction on the infringer.
60
  While it is not a necessary conclusion, another way to state 
this is if the plaintiff fails this test, an injunction is not granted.  For purposes of our discussion 
today, the courts can use a slightly modified version of these four factors to create a viable and 
working framework to shape a decision on mandatory licensing in individual cases.   
 The first factor is important in that the potential licensor will have the opportunity to 
show that a compulsory license will not result in irreparable injury to the patent holder.  One of 
the main facets of a patent is the ability to exclude others from using your patented information 
                                                        
58
 Skop, supra note 55, at 137-138; See eBay, 547 U.S. at 390 (2006). 
59
 eBay, at 393-394 (referring to the Court of Appeals’ decision granting eBay a permanent 
injunction from using the patent, the court stated, “[t]he [Court of Appeals] articulated a ‘general 
rule,’ unique to patent disputes, "that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and 
validity have been adjudged.’... The [Court of Appeals] further indicated that injunctions should 
be denied only in the ‘unusual’ case, under ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘’in rare instances . . 
. to protect the public interest.’’ … Just as the District Court erred in its categorical denial of 
injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief.”). 
60
 ebay, at 391 (stating that “a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor 
test before a court may grant such relief” (emphasis added)). 
 14 
and under some circumstances, no monetary award could replace that right.
61
  For example, there 
may be circumstances that prevent a patent holder from immediately producing or licensing his 
patent.  In such a case, a compulsory license would cause irreparable harm by granting a license 
to a competitor that could eat away at the holder’s potential market share.  A monetary sum, in 
such a case, would not be able to make up for that loss.
62
   
Even though irreparable harm and the second prong are separate, they do overlap to some 
extent.
63
  The second prong of the test will enable the potential licensor to demonstrate that a 
licensing fee will be adequate to compensate for the use of the patent. Under this prong, the 
licensor will have to show that monetary compensation will be adequate to cover the loss of the 
right of exclusivity.
64
  The court and potential licensee do not have to rely on the patentee’s 
alleged monetary loss by the grant of the compulsory license, but it should be judged in a fair 
and equitable way. 
The third element will focus on the balance of hardships between the patentee and the 
licensee.  Here, several factors can be examined; the relative size of the parties, any efforts of the 
                                                        
61
 Black & Decker v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86990 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 
2006) (The Cout stated, “[b]ecause the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, 
the nature of the patent grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always suffice 
to make the patentee whole.” (quoting Reebok Intern. Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 
(Fed. Cir. 1994))). 
62
 Wald et al. v. Mudhopper Oilfield Svcs., Inc. et al., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669, at 16 (W.D. 
Okla. July 27, 2006) (Irreparable harm is "'often suffered when the injury can[not] be adequately 
atoned for in money . . . or when the district court cannot remedy [the injury] following a final 
determination on the merits,'" as when the plaintiff loses market share or its reputation for 
innovation. (citing Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir. 
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patent holder to manufacture or license his patent, the bargaining history between the parties, any 
previous dealing between the parties, and the availability of any alternatives to compulsory 
licensing.  Here, the court can look, and the licensee may provide, any inference of a blocking 
patent.
65
 
Finally, the public interest will be looked at.  Public interest can come in many forms.  
One example of a public interest that would trump a patent holder’s right is the case of 
Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge.
66
  There, the Court reversed an injunction that would have 
prevented the infringer-city from using a patented sewage purification process to treat its 
sewage.
67
  If the city was prevented from using the patented process, the sewage would be 
dumped into the lake that also provided the city’s drinking water.68  In supporting its decision, 
the Court followed a line of cases that stated, “injunctive relief was denied on the ground that it 
was not absolutely essential to preserve the rights of the patentee, and would cause the infringer 
irreparable damage.”69  Other cases have held public interest will trump a patentee’s right to an 
injunction.
70
  Now that the four factors have been laid out, we can turn to what the potential 
licensee receives if successful. 
                                                        
65
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The licensee will receive a non-exclusive compulsory license and the patentee will be 
prohibited from commencing a forfeiture proceeding within two years after the grant of the 
license.  The two-year waiting period is established for several reasons.  First, this is the required 
waiting period set up under the Paris Convention and used by many countries.
71
  Second, it 
allows the licensee time to work the licensed patent.  This benefits both the licensee and the 
public because the previously non-used technology is now available in the marketplace.  The 
licensee should also be allowed a minimum amount of surety after taking the time and expense to 
receive the compulsory license.  Finally, the two-year period is short enough that it permits the 
patent holder, now the forced licensor, to take concrete steps towards manufacturing or licensing 
the technology.  The proposal will permit the patent holder to seek an adjustment to the 
compulsory license terms or revocation if the patentee begins manufacturing the technology.  
Now that the license has been granted, it is important to determine the appropriate license fee. 
 
Licensing Fees 
The idea of establishing an appropriate licensing fee may at first seem like a daunting, if 
not impossible task.
72
  First, it is important to recognize that if a court issued a mandatory 
license, the parties would be given the opportunity to decide on a reasonable fee themselves.  
When parties are in a position where the court may impose a rate on them if they do not reach a 
decision, it provides a strong incentive to come together on reasonable terms.
73
  If the parties 
cannot agree on terms, the task is easy by turning to both the existing patent framework and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 285 (9th Cir. 1945) (public interest 
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judicial decisions.  Current patent law lays out that when a patent has been infringed, the court 
shall award monetary damages that are adequate to cover the infringement, “but in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer…”.74  Under these 
rules, courts have determined what a reasonable licensing fee would be.
75
  In determining what a 
reasonable rate should be, it is easy to turn to existing licensing agreements.
76
  Often courts turn 
to the established royalty rate on other contracts for the invention, but in the case of the proposed 
regulation there will be no established rate on a non-use patent.  Instead, when no rate is 
presently established, courts often turn to the royalty comparison approach.
77
  This method looks 
at what a “willing buyer and willing seller” would have negotiated and establishes this as the 
reasonable royalty rate.
78
  Simply stated, the court should look at as many different facts as they 
view helpful in determining the reasonable rate.
79
  These various methods have been applied in 
many cases and are not an issue of first impression for the courts.
80
  This methodology can be 
used to establish a reasonable and transparent fee that is appropriate for the use of the 
compulsory license.  
 
V. Examination Under Principles of Intellectual Property 
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 Now that the proposal has been laid out, it is important to decide whether this is a path 
worth taking.  In order to do that, we will examine the proposed change against the current patent 
law under various analytical methods used by commentators to judge the merits of an intellectual 
property law. 
 
International News Service Approach 
 
 International News Service v. The Associated Press
81
 is one of the first places to start 
when examining property rights.  While the law applied in INS is neither patent, copyright, or 
trademark, but the doctrine of misappropriation, it is still considered of fundamental importance 
for the understanding and application of intellectual property.
82
  The case provides a guideline 
for the balancing of rights to public access and exclusive rights to use information.  INS dealt 
with two competitors that gather and disseminate the news for profit, INS and AP.
83
  AP spent 
over $3.5 million per year in gathering the news and disseminating it to its member agencies.
84
   
INS spent money gathering the news as well, but did pirate some news stories from AP by 
bribing AP members or simply taking AP’s news stories off bulletin boards.85  Here, the Court 
held that this amounted to misappropriation and ordered an injunction.
86
  In coming to this 
decision, the Court stated that INS’s “process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the 
normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to 
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be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to 
those who have not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact 
that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news.” 87  In explaining one 
of the limitations they were placing on the injunction, the Court stated it is “only to the extent 
necessary to prevent that competitor from reaping the fruits of [AP]’s efforts and expenditure.”88 
 The Court in Int’l News found that the major problem was International News Service’s 
interference occurred exactly when AP was about to make a profit from their hard-earned 
collection of information.  Instead of having to pay the costs of collecting this information itself, 
Int’l could instead simply take the news from AP and sell it themselves.  At first glance, it seems 
as though the proposed compulsory licensing would complete the same task.  On the contrary, 
the proposed compulsory licensing would only be permitted if the potential licensor could satisfy 
the four factors set forth above.  By taking into account the irreparable harm to the patent holder 
and the balance of hardships, the District Court will be able to avoid the situation in Int’l News.   
For starters, these factors will take into consideration any efforts taken by the patent holder to 
manufacture or license the invention.  This would prevent a party such as Int’l News from 
receiving a compulsory license while the patent holder was using the patent himself.  
Furthermore, the situation in INS would be avoided because a reasonable fee will be established 
in any case where a compulsory license is granted on a non-use patent.  This means that instead 
of outlaying just a couple dollars like Int’l News did in order to “steal” the news from AP, the 
licensor would be required to shell out a reasonable fee that would presumably more than cover 
the costs associated with gathering the news.   
The proposed rule change would also fall better in line with the INS Court’s explanation 
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of the proper limitation on the injunction.  Current law goes beyond the extent necessary to 
protect the profits of the intellectual property right holder.  The law instead should retract in 
accordance with the proposal so that it permits the right holder to reap benefits through either the 
use or licensing of his patent.  This will protect the right holder to the extent necessary to allow 
him to reap the benefits of his patent. 
  
The Net Benefits Approach 
 
The “net benefit” approach is a theory of intellectual property law that attempts to find 
the exact balance between the amount of incentives and the amount of public access.
89
  This 
approach allows us to label both incentives and access as costs and weigh them against each 
other. By providing more incentives to intellectual property rights holders, the government is 
fostering innovation, leading to the creation of more information.  The cost of these increased 
incentives, however, is the restriction of public access to the information.  Conversely, increasing 
access to the protected materials allows more of the public to benefit from the information.  The 
cost to increased access, on the other hand, is that it reduces the amount of information 
produced.
90
  The net benefits approach as leads us to the conclusion that, “[a]n increase in access 
to intellectual property is justified only when the value of the benefits resulting from increased 
access is greater than the value of decreased creative activity resulting from decreased 
incentives.”91 
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Current law creates too many incentives for patentees by granting exclusive rights that 
apply irrespective of whether the patent is used or not.  Consequently, the cost to the public of 
accessing that information is too high, resulting in less people benefitting from the information.  
The patent holder is granted the extremely high incentive of having exclusive rights to his patent 
without the requirement to use it.  This high incentive results in the production of more 
beneficial information.  On the other hand, when the holder does not use a patent, the public 
simply does not benefit from the exclusive license at all. While the basis for the patent is 
available at the USPTO, the actual device or item is not available to anyone.  This creates the 
highest cost to access possible, complete exclusion.  
The proposed change to the current patent law regime would result in a better balance 
under the net benefits approach.  The change would accurately reflect the conclusion reached 
under the net benefits approach.
92
  By establishing a process for compulsory licensing, we would 
increase the access to intellectual property.  This is justified because the value of the benefits as a 
result of the increased access is greater than the value of the creative activity that would result 
from decreased incentives.  The increased access to the un-used patents would enable the public 
to enjoy the fruits of that information that is currently not being shared.  The negative effect on 
creation of new material will be minimal because patent holders will be able to keep their 
exclusive rights as long as they use the patent.  Furthermore, even if they do not use the patent, 
the patent holder will only be stripped of that exclusive right if the potential licensor can satisfy 
the four prongs.  In sum, the change is justified because the increased access to this previously 
untapped information outweighs the small decrease in creation from stripping away the exclusive 
right in certain non-use situations. 
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Externalities Approach 
 
 The externalities approach is another way to weigh the costs and benefits associated with 
a law.  In order to fully comprehend this approach we first need to split externalities into both 
positives and negatives.  A negative externality occurs when an action that an individual engages 
in creates a cost or harm to another, or society in general.
93
 On the other hand, a positive 
externality transpires when an activity by an individual creates a benefit to another.
94
  There is 
often a gap, however, between the economic consequences of an action and a legal reality.
95
  
With a negative externality, the cost to society may be felt economically, but the law may not 
require the individual who caused the harm to internalize it.
 96
  With a positive externality, 
society may benefit from an individual’s actions, but the law may not allow the individual to 
internalize that gain. 
 Creating rules that we can apply in the case of intellectual property is another important 
step in examining a law under the externalities approach.  The first step to creating rules is 
understanding the underlying clarifications that lead us to these rules.
97
  First, we need to realize 
that the principle goal of intellectual property “is not to maximize total gains resulting from 
creativity,”98 but instead to maximize net social gains.99  Second, it is important to notice that 
protecting these gain results in costs: the cost of administrating an intellectual property system; 
private transactional costs of parties in the IP arena; and the cost of granting exclusive rights 
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which results in less access by the public.
100
 The final clarification is that we need to compare the 
total benefits and the total costs of producing the creative work.
101
 Together, this leads us to two 
economic rules in order to approach positive externalities: 
1. Internalization of positive externalities will be facilitated as long as the cost of the 
facilitation does not exceed the social benefits of the work. 
2. No costs beyond the minimum necessary to bring [intellectual property]-worthy 
works into existence should be incurred.
102
 
When applying these rules, we also need to scrutinize the law and its process to decide “whether 
a more expensive process of separating works that result in a net gain from those resulting in a 
net loss is worth the costs.”103 
 Now that we have laid out the externalities approach and understand the underlying 
principles, we can examine both the current law and the proposed change of allowing mandatory 
licensing of non-use technology patents.  Currently, the patent system grants patent holders 
exclusive rights whether or not they use or license their patent,
104
 meaning that this permits the 
patent holder to internalize positive externalities.  The problem with this system, however, is that 
it does not maximize social benefits because a non-use patent is not providing any social benefits 
because no one has the ability to use or purchase the underlying technology of the patent.  The 
current system, therefore, clearly violates the first rule because the cost of internalizing the 
positive externality far exceeds the social benefits of the work.  Current patent law also violates 
the second rule because the costs are beyond what is necessary to bring about the creation of 
these works.  Administrative costs associated with the current system are quite low because there 
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are only minimal exceptions to the current right of exclusivity.
105
  Transactional costs for non-
use patents in the current system are also low because the fact that the patents are non-use means 
that there no licenses which would have required negotiations.  However, the cost of exclusivity 
itself is extremely high in the case of non-use patents because besides from minor exceptions
106
, 
the public is completely excluded from access to the underlying technology.  Altogether, the low 
administrative costs are overwhelmed by the high transactional and exclusivity costs.  The failure 
of the two rules by current patent law means that it needs to be adjusted in some way. 
 The proposed adjustment to patent law will provide a system that better satisfies the 
externalities approach.  When looking at these rules, we must keep in mind that the change will 
only apply to non-use technology patents and not patents in general.  The proposed system 
provides a better path for the first rule because it will allow for the internalization of benefits, by 
permitting patent holders to have exclusivity rights if they use their patents.  The internalization 
of these benefits, unlike the current law, will not outweigh the social benefits achieved by 
allowing access to these previously inaccessible patented technologies.  The second rule is where 
there is area for debate on the merits of the proposed rule.  The administrative costs of 
implementing the new system will be higher than the current system.  The additional time and 
effort it will take the District Court to decide on the merits of the mandatory license applications 
will be, admittedly, higher.  The transactional costs will be much lower though due to the fact 
that the patent holder cannot drive license fees up to astronomical levels simply by sitting on the 
patent for years.  The fact that the potential licensees can obtain fair pricing if they prove the 
patent holder is not using the patent in any way will result in both more equal bargaining power 
and reasonable pricing.  Moreover, exclusivity costs will be much lower because the public can 
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gain access to the technology that was previously not available to them.  Netting all costs, it 
seems as though the increased administrative costs are balanced out by the decreased 
transactional and exclusivity costs.  This would suggest that the proposed change falls directly in 
line with the second rule because we are exactly at the minimum amount of costs.  Any more 
protection to patented work is unnecessary and any less protection could start to hinder the 
amount of creativity produced.  Putting the two rules together, it is easy to see that allowing for 
compulsory licensing for non-use patents is a better solution than the current law according to 
the externalities approach.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
Under the new rule, there will be a better balance between incentives for patent holders 
and the public.  The proposition does not detract from the patent holder’s right to make a profit, 
but instead places the patent holder and public on a more level playing field. The proposal will 
admittedly result in a small decrease in creation, but this will be eclipsed by the increased 
availability of previously unused technologies in the marketplace.  Further, the positive 
internalization costs have been too high for too long and it is the public who has been suffering 
through lower social benefits.  Lowering these internalization costs is necessary so as to increase 
the social benefits flowing from these untapped patents. 
Compulsory licensing of non-use patents will, moreover, bring the United States in 
alignment with international standards.  International treaties and foreign law have developed a 
useful system that is reflected throughout this plan.  The plan, furthermore, brings patent law, as 
a whole, in line with the limited, yet imperative, areas of compulsory licensing currently 
included in US law. 
 26 
The proposal laid out above is not only the right move, but it is a necessary move for our 
patent system.  The current system has been exploited at the expense of technological and 
societal advancement.  This has lead to a patent environment that is contrary to both the 
underpinnings of American innovation and the Constitution.  This proposal will not only reverse 
the current trend, but better reflect these foundations. 
 
 
